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SYMPOSIUM
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY:
SEARCHING FOR THE
RIGHT BALANCE
INTRODUCTION: "ATROCIOUS JUDGES"
AND "ODIOUS" COURTS REVISITED
Robert N. Strassfeld
In 1968 the Columbia Law Review published Robert Cover's re-
view of Richard Hildreth's book, Atrocious Judges: Lives of Judges
Infamous as Tools of Tyrants and Instruments of Oppression, which
Hildreth had published in 1856.' Even by the standards of legal publi-
cation, the 112-year lag is remarkable. Of course, neither Cover's
review, nor Hildreth's book were what they appeared to be at first
glance. Hildreth picked among the biographies of English judges in
Lord Campbell's Lives of the Chief Justices ,2 and selected the biogra-
phies of the most contemptible to republish in his collection. To this,
Hildreth, already known as an antislavery publicist, appended the
petitions and opinions in the case of Passmore Williamson, a Phila-
delphia abolitionist, who was jailed for contempt of court for his role
in abetting the escape of a slave family in defiance of the Fugitive
Slave Act. Hildreth's point was obviously not to relive the worst of
English judicial history, but to draw the comparison between his se-
t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
I Robert M. Cover, Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1003 (1968) (reviewing RICHARD
HILDRETH, ATROCIOUS JUDGES: LIVES OF JUDGES INFAMOUS AS TOOLS OF TYRANTS AND
INSTRUMENTS OF OPPRESSION (1856)).
2 There are several editions of Lord Campbell's book, published under slightly different
titles. E.g. JOHN CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND (1873-1876).
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lect assembly of servants of tyranny and an American judiciary that
was nearly uniformly proslavery in its decisions.
Like Hildreth, Cover was speaking to his times. "The federal judi-
ciary," Cover wrote, "has remained faithful to its long tradition as
executors of immoral law."' No longer, of course, were the issues the
Fugitive Slave Act and support for slavery. Instead, Cover con-
demned judges as accessories to tyranny through their enforcement of
the selective service laws against draft resisters during the Vietnam
War. Cover concluded with the thought that the blood of American
soldiers is on the hands not only of the Johnson administration, but of
those judges and prosecutors who vigorously enforced the draft laws.4
Such attention to, and attacks on, the judiciary, especially the fed-
eral judiciary, recur throughout our history. In the late 19th and early
20th centuries, for instance, Populists, Progressives and trade union-
ists all condemned the federal bench as the servant of wealth and
capital. These critics condemned the courts, and especially the United
States Supreme Court, for an array of decisions and approaches, in-
cluding the development of substantive due process jurisprudence,
aggressive use of injunctions against labor unions and state regulatory
commissions, and a general bias against unions and consumers and in
favor of big business.5 Many of the criticisms sound familiar to the
contemporary ear, though in modem times the criticism has more
typically come from the other end of the political spectrum. Progres-
sives decried the lack of deference to the democratic branches of the
federal government and to state governments, and they accused the
courts of acting as super legislatures willing to read the personal
predilections of judges into statutes in defiance of the legislative and
popular will.
6
Progressives attacked the courts as antidemocratic and counter-
majoritarian. In 1912, New York lawyer, Gilbert Roe, condemned the
'judicial oligarchy" in a book bearing that title.7 In his introduction to
Roe's book, the Progressive Wisconsin Senator, Robert La Follette
wrote:
3 Cover, supra note 1, at 1005.
4 Id. at 1008.
5 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ER.E, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 1 1-16, 19-26 (2000); WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES,
AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 10-21 passim (1994).
6 Other criticisms, notably the accusations of class bias, do not have such clear modem
echoes.
7 GILBERT E. ROE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY (1911).
[Vol. 56:4
INTRODUCTION
Evidence abounds that, as constituted to-day, the courts per-
vert justice almost as often as they administer it. Precedent
and procedure have combined to make one law for the rich
and another for the poor. The regard of the courts for fossil-
ized precedent, their absorption in technicalities, their de-
tachment from the vital, living facts of the present day, their
constant thinking on the side of the rich and powerful and
privileged classes have brought our courts into conflict with
the democratic spirit and purposes of this generation. More-
over, by usurping the power to declare statutes unconstitu-
tional and by presuming to read their own views into statutes
without regard to the plain intention of the legislators, they
have become in reality the supreme law-making and law-
giving institution of our government. They have taken to
themselves a power it was never intended they should exer-
cise; a power greater than that entrusted to the courts of any
other enlightened nation. And because this tremendous power
has been so generally exercised on the side of the wealthy and
powerful few, the courts have become at last the strongest
bulwark of special privilege.8
Roe and other critics, such as then-Professor Felix Frankfurter, ques-
tioned whether the Fourteenth Amendment should be repealed, given
its transformation by the courts into an instrument for protecting
business against regulation.9 Charles Amidon, a Progressive federal
judge from North Dakota, simply pronounced that in their obstruction
of reform the courts had become "odious." 10
Armed with this critique, Progressives and other critics of judicial
conservatism sought to rein in the courts. La Follette captured this
spirit in writing that, "neither courts nor their decisions can properly
remain above and beyond the control of the sovereign citizens. Judges
cannot perform their high function in the public interest unless they
are made acquainted with public needs and are responsive to the pub-
lic will."" Most of their efforts were unsuccessful, including Ne-
braska Senator Norris's proposal to abolish diversity jurisdiction and
La Follette's proposal of a constitutional amendment providing for
the election of federal judges and of another that would permit Con-
gress to reenact with a super-majority vote federal legislation that the
8 Robert M. La Follette, Introduction to ROE, supra note 7, at vi-vii.
9 Ross, supra note 5, at 66-67, 291.
10 Charles F. Amidon to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Jan. 19, 1911, Holmes Papers, Box
37, Folder 20, quoted in PURCELL, supra note 5, at 14.
" La Follette, supra note 8, at vi.
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Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional. 12 Congressional critics
did succeed in curbing the power of the federal courts to issue labor
injunctions, with the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 3 These
battles ultimately culminated in President Roosevelt's ill-conceived
and unsuccessful court-packing plan.
This symposium is the product of another moment of widespread
criticism of the courts. That criticism appeared to come to a head in
the final moments of the tragic drama revolving around Terry
Schiavo, though it had been percolating for a long time before the
Schiavo controversy. Those who rallied to the support of Schiavo's
parents against her husband Michael's assertions regarding her wishes
pertaining to heroic medical intervention to keep her alive attacked
both the Florida state courts and the federal courts for their decisions
in the case. Both Congress and the Florida state legislature, with the
support of their respective Bush-brother Chief Executives, sought to
advance the parents' position by undoing adverse court decisions.
When, notwithstanding congressional intervention, Michael Schiavo
prevailed in his effort to remove the feeding tube that was keeping his
wife alive, congressional rhetoric became especially intemperate.
House Speaker Tom DeLay threatened that the judges involved would
be held to account, and spoke of imposing new limits on federal
jurisdiction, while Texas Senator John Comyn suggested that recent
murders of judges and members of their families were somehow a
response to "political decisions" rendered by an unaccountable
judiciary. 14 Representative Steve King of Iowa reminded us of the
power that Congress wields over the federal district courts, stating
that Congress has "the constitutional authority to eliminate any and
all inferior courts," and threatening impeachment of noncompliant
judges.'5 Oklahoma Senator Tom Coburn's Chief of Staff, Michael
Schwartz, suggested the possibility of "mass impeachment.' 16
As the examples of the Schiavo controversy and the Progressive
critique of the judiciary show, calls for greater "accountability" or for
preserving "independence" are products of their times. Much of the
12 PURCELL, supra note 5, at 77-85; Ross, supra note 5, at 193-217, 254-84.
13 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 101-15 (LexisNexis 2006); see PURCELL, supra note 5, at 85-91.
14 Charles Babington, Senator Links Violence to "Political" Decisions, WASH. POST, Apr.
5, 2005, at A07; Charles Babington, GOP Is Fracturing Over Power ofJudiciary, WAS. POST,
Apr. 7, 2005, at A04 [hereinafter Babington, GOP Is Fracturing]; Carl Hulse & David D.
Kirkpatrick, DeLay Says Federal Judiciary Has "Run Amok, " Adding Congress Is Partly To
Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2005, § A, at 21; Cynthia Tucker, Fiery Rhetoric Could Explode,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 10, 2005, at F6.
15 Babington, GOP Is Fracturing, supra note 14.
16 Hulse & Kirkpatrick, supra note 14. To be sure, to date Congress has not acted on these
threats and the rhetoric has simmered down.
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discussion is driven by dissatisfaction with the current direction of the
courts, often focused on a small number of decisions, albeit ones that
have a powerful political resonance. Like La Follette before him,
Judge Robert Bork has advocated a constitutional amendment allow-
ing Congress to overrule Supreme Court declarations of a statute's
unconstitutionality, yet it is hard to imagine the two of them agreeing
on much regarding the performance of the courts. 17 Similarly, long
before Congressman King's musings about abolishing the inferior
federal courts, Progressive Nebraska Senator, George Norris, pro-
posed the idea."8
Stripped of their context, the concepts of independence and ac-
countability may be hollow and uninformative. Part of the problem is
that both terms are relational. They only make sense in reference to
something outside of the judiciary. To whom, or what, do we want
judges to be accountable? Obvious, but very different possibilities
include, the political branches, the popular will, the Constitution (not
that we can agree on what fealty to the Constitution looks like) or a
tradition of reasoned elaboration and commitment to precedent. From
whom, or what, do we want them to be independent? Does independ-
ence mean that courts are dangerously poised to thwart the democ-
ratic will as their Progressive critics thought? Conversely, since the
judiciary, especially where judges are not elected, is most immune
from the growing sway of private power, has its independence be-
come more important than ever?19
Wisely, the editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review, in
organizing this symposium quickly decided to look beyond the im-
mediate debate over the Schiavo case and legislation. Instead, they
invited scholars who go beyond the well-trodden controversies re-
garding judicial independence and accountability. While each partici-
pant obviously has his or her political commitments, the articles and
responses that follow evince an effort to reach beyond the passions of
the moment in order to say something more enduring about the rela-
tionship between the courts and the other branches of government.
As noted above, much of the discussion regarding the judiciary has
consisted of little more than political sloganeering. Professor Charles
17 ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHrNO TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE 117-18 (1996). Judge Bork's proposal, actually goes well beyond La
Follette's. It would make "any federal or state court decision subject to being overruled by a
majority vote of each House of Congress." Id. at 117. To be sure, in support of his proposal, he
invokes La Follette.
18 Ross, supra note 5, at 188. Norris understood, however, that his proposal had no pros-
pect for adoption, perhaps Congressman King did, as well.
19 See James G. Wilson, Noam Chomsky and Judicial Review, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 439,
442-444 (1996).
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Geyh20 notes that calls for judicial accountability have typically
served as a shorthand for greater restriction on the jurisdictional reach
or the power of the courts and that proponents have typically been
those who are hostile to the substantive leanings, or perceived lean-
ings, of the courts. Those, in turn, who worry about the erosion of
those substantive decisions tend to frame "accountability" and "inde-
pendence" as polar opposites and raise the banner of "independence."
Geyh worries that such a mechanical invocation of "independence" in
response to calls for "accountability" too quickly cedes the concept of
accountability to the courts' critics.
Professor Geyh attempts to rescue the discussion of accountability
from political sloganeering by describing a typology of judicial ac-
countability. In so doing, he shows that much of what we might mean
by accountability is noncontroversial. For instance, no one would
suggest that it is proper for judges to have a financial interest in the
outcome of their cases. The consensus about accountability breaks
down, however, when it comes to accountability for "decisional er-
ror." Here, Professor Geyh distinguishes between inadvertent and
deliberate decisional error and argues that only the latter should be
sanctionable. Recognizing the difficulty of distinguishing intentional
from unintentional error, he proposes to protect judges from perpetual
harassment for unpopular decisions through a rebuttable presumption
of good faith.
Professors Susan Bandes 21 and William Marshall 22 applaud the
usefulness and clarity of Geyh's typology. They question, however,
whether Geyh's distinction between intentional, and therefore, sanc-
tionable decisional error, and unintentional nonsanctionable deci-
sional error is either appropriate or meaningful. Marshall points to a
number of Supreme Court decisions that one might characterize as
deliberate distortions of the law in order to achieve a greater good and
asks whether we really think that the Justices in those instances ought
to have been punished. Noting that what seems to distinguish inten-
tional from unintentional error in Geyh's analysis is decision-making
based on political rather than legal grounds, they question whether a
regime of sanctions based on that distinction is either operable or ju-
risprudentially defensible. The effort to separate law from politics
was very much at the heart of nineteenth-century classical legal
20 Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of Political
Rhetoric, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 911 (2006).
21 Susan Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability: A Reply to Charles Geyh, 56
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 947 (2006).
22 William P. Marshall, Judicial Accountability in a Time of Legal Realism, 56 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 937 (2006).
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thought, but the notion that such a distinction is desirable and possible
may not have survived legal realism.
23
Dean Lisa Kloppenberg24 considers one practice that is ostensibly
protective of judicial independence: the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance. She focuses specifically on the canon of statutory con-
struction that calls for narrow construction of a statute in order to
avoid serious constitutional questions.
This longstanding rule of constitutional avoidance is among those
articulated by Justice Brandeis in his Ashwander concurrence.
Brandeis expected the courts to show proper deference to Congress
and state legislatures, by avoiding, where possible, invalidation of
their legislation.25 In addition to showing proper respect for a coordi-
nate branch of government, the practice of avoidance by narrow statu-
tory construction is thought to promote judicial independence by
avoiding conflict, and therefore, congressional reprisal. Finally, the
doctrine's adherents suggest that its observance will promote consti-
tutional dialogue among the branches, or with state governments.
Dean Kloppenberg criticizes this doctrine and the rationales of-
fered for its support. Building on her prior work in the area, she ar-
gues that the doctrine disadvantages the poor and marginalized who
generally lack access to influence the other branches.26 She then turns
to the claims that the doctrine protects judicial independence by
avoiding unnecessary conflict with Congress or the states. She argues
that in practice courts often employ the doctrine, not deferentially, but
aggressively to rewrite, and distort, legislation and to engage in what
amounts to constitutional decision-making on a subconstitutional
level. She questions how effective these practices can be in fostering
constitutional dialogue. Acknowledging that courts sometimes should
avoid difficult constitutional questions, she calls for a reversal of the
presumption that currently favors avoidance.
23 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at
9-31 passim (1992); WILLIAM M. WiECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT,
64-112 (1998).
24 Lisa A_ Kloppenberg, Does Avoiding Constitutional Questions Promote Judicial Inde-
pendence?, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1031 (2006).
25 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
26 LISA A KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: How THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD
CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW (2001); Lisa A- Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious
Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech
Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1996).
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Both Professor Melvyn Durchslag2 and Professor Michelle
Slack21 agree that the avoidance doctrines can have perverse
consequences and may disadvantage the politically vulnerable. They
share with Dean Kloppenberg a skepticism about how deferential the
courts have really been in practice and how effective the avoidance
doctrines have been in dispelling interbranch rivalry. Nevertheless,
each takes issue with aspects of her analysis. Professor Durchslag,
who professes ambivalence about avoidance techniques, argues that
avoidance is both an inevitable consequence of our system of divided
government, and, in some instances, both advantageous and, perhaps,
no greater a source of constitutional uncertainty than divided
constitutional decisions. Professor Slack reaches the same conclusion
as Dean Kloppenberg, that the presumption should disfavor avoiding
serious constitutional questions through narrow, all too often,
distorting, statutory construction, but she differs in how she reaches
that conclusion. She notes that unlike such other avoidance
techniques as abstention and justiciability doctrines, the doctrine of
avoidance through narrow construction does not bar the court house
door. Indeed, by assuming the likelihood of constitutional difficulty
and construing the statute to avoid confronting that constitutional
difficulty, the doctrine tends "to overprotect those alleging
constitutional infringement," though without a clear statement of the
constitutional right.29 Thus, she faults the doctrine for tainting
legislation with a presumption of unconstitutionality, thereby turning
on its head the principal of statutory construction that statutes are
entitled to a presumption of constitutionality.
Professors Jonathan Entin and Erik Jensen 30 venture where few
constitutional and federal courts scholars dare go, into the realm of
taxation. Specifically, they examine the purpose and application of
the Compensation Clause,3' which, along with the grant of life tenure,
is how the Constitution expressly protects judicial independence. En-
tin and Jensen first consider the original understanding of the Com-
pensation Clause. They then examine the doctrinal history of the
27 Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Inevitability (and Desirability?) ofAvoidance: A Response
to Dean Kloppenberg, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1043 (2006).
28 Michelle R. Slack, Avoiding Avoidance: Why Use of the Constitutional Avoidance
Canon Undermines Judicial Independence-A Response to Lisa Kloppenberg, 56 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 1057 (2006).
29 Id. at 1061.
30 Jonathan L. Entin & Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, Compenstation, and Judicial Independ-
ence, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 965 (2006).
31 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The clause says that "The Judges... shall, at stated Times, re-
ceive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continu-
ance in Office."
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clause, focusing most extensively on a series of twentieth-century
cases that involved the taxation of Article III judges. This history
culminated in the Court's 2001 decision, United States v. Hatter,
32
which the authors assume, and hope, is the Court's last word on the
topic.
Retaliatory pay cuts, the scenario that the framers had in mind, are
politically not a realistic threat. Rather, the Compensation Clause has
been tested by instances where judges have been subjected to taxa-
tion. The question finally laid to rest in Hatter was whether Congress
can extend a tax of general application to sitting judges, including
judges who had previously been exempt from the tax. Professors En-
tin and Jensen argue that the Court correctly concluded that Congress
may subject Article III judges to a tax of general application. 
3
Though they conclude that Hatter should be the end of the story, they
see on the horizon an understanding of the Compensation Clause, that
the framer's intent was not merely to protect judicial independence,
but to guarantee that compensation was sufficient to ensure that the
right sort of people could be recruited to become judges, which might
revivify claims of the Compensation Clause as a check on taxation of
judges. Such a reading of the Compensation Clause, they argue is
neither supported by the original understanding of the framers, nor a
sensible approach toward judicial recruitment.
Professor Mark Miller 34 is skeptical of claims that any Supreme
Court ruling is necessarily the final word on a constitutional subject,
and therefore, takes a small exception to Professors Entin's and
Jensen's analysis. Generally agreeing with their argument, he turns
instead to an examination of other means available to Congress to
express its displeasure with or attempt to control the federal judiciary.
At first blush, Professor Mark Tushnet3" appears to have returned
us to the midst of current controversies, since he focuses on pending
legislation, the Constitution Restoration Act of 2005. However, the
Act's proponents introduced the bill with little expectation of
enactment, and Professor Tushnet chooses to focus on the more
32 532 U.S. 557 (2001).
33 They criticize, however, one part of the decision. The Court had to decide whether cer-
tain Social Security taxes could be extended to previously exempt federal judges. The Court
held that extension of the Medicare tax was permissible, but that the extension of the Old Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) tax was impermissible because the removal of that
exemption was discriminatory. Entin and Jensen find this latter conclusion to be flawed.
34 Mark C. Miller, When Congress Attacks the Federal Courts, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1015 (2006).
35 Mark Tushnet, The "Constitution Restoration Act" and Judicial Independence: Some
Observations, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1071 (2006).
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obscure provisions of the bill.36 Specifically, the Constitution
Restoration Act would bar a court from relying on any foreign law,
"other than English constitutional and common law up to the time of
the adoption of the Constitution of the United States" when
interpreting or applying the United States Constitution. Further, it
deems violation of this provision an impeachable offense.3 7 Thus an
unlikely vehicle for discussion, a bill with no real prospect for
passage, becomes an opportunity to explore the limits of permissible
congressional interference with the operation of federal courts and the
permissible grounds for impeachment.
Before considering these questions, Professor Tushnet briefly
examines some of the difficulties posed by the bill on its own terms.
What would constitute reliance on foreign law? How would we
necessarily know if judges did so rely, unless they told us? Turning to
his principal questions, Tushnet first asks whether Congress has the
power to limit the sources of law relied upon for constitutional
interpretation. The problem here is United States v. Klein,38 which
prohibits congressional interference with the courts' rules of decision.
Professor Tushnet argues that the Klein problem really involves a
continuum of greater and lesser degrees of congressional interference
with judicial interpretive methods, and, though he acknowledges that
it would be a close case, he concludes that the Constitution
Restoration Act would pass muster under a Klein analysis. Turning to
the Act's impeachment provision, Tushnet ponders whether the Act
provides a sufficient "legal" basis for impeachment, to permit
Congress, if it were unhappy with a particular judge's reliance on
foreign law in her decision-making, to impeach and remove that judge
for more than mere political disagreement with how she had decided a
case. Again he concludes that the Act would pass constitutional
muster.
36 He chooses not to focus on the jurisdiction stripping provisions of the bill, which would
take him back onto the well-beaten path of federal courts scholarship.
37 The bill is obviously in response to a number of recent Supreme Court decisions that
have discussed foreign law in their analysis, whether or not the Court ultimately relied on that
law. See, e.g., Atkans v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 n.21 (2002) (holding execution of the men-
tally retarded unconstitutional); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003) (declaring
Texas sodomy statute prohibiting c-... -zn'-ual, adult, sexual activity amongst same-sex partners
unconstitutional); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (prohibiting application of
death penalty to those who were under eighteen at the time of the offense). The apparent reli-
ance on foreign law has drawn criticism both from within the Court and without. See, e.g., id. at
608, 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting), Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Inter-
pret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004); Steven G. Calabresi & David C. Presser,
Reintroducing Circuit Riding a Timely Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1386, 1388 (2006) (propos-
ing, with tongue only partly in cheek, reintroduction of circuit riding for Supreme Court justices
during the summer "to rein in the Justices' transatlantic legal dalliances").
38 80 U.S. 128 (1871).
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In response, Professor Ronald Kahn3 9 asks why Professor Tushnet
appears to think that enactment of the Constitution Restoration Act
would have little consequence. Professor Kahn situates Tushnet's
analysis within a larger body of Tushnet's work, his recent writing on
"popular constitutionalism." 40 He criticizes, Tushnet's analysis of the
Act, along with his theory of popular constitutionalism more gener-
ally as undervaluing the distinct role of courts and the Supreme Court
and consequently in undervaluing judicial independence in favor of
the political branches.
39 Ronald Kahn, The Constitution Restoration Act, Judicial Independence, and Popular
Constitutionalism, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1083 (2006).
40 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
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